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THE CYPRUS CRISIS 1974-75:
POLITICAL-JURIDICAL ASPECTS*
by
Ann Van Wynen Thomas** and A.J. Thomas, fr.***
O N July 15, 1974, Greek officers, who commanded the Greek Cypriot
National Guard, staged a coup d' tat overthrowing the legitimate Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus and attempting to assassinate the democrat-
ically elected President of that Republic, Archbishop Makarios. The coup and
attempted assassination were instigated on instruction from the military junta
then ruling in Greece. The purpose of these actions was to impose on Cyprus
a government more favorable to that military junta and thereby bring about
enosis (union) with Greece.' Makarios, being forewarned of the plot,
escaped, and with the help of the British was flown to London. 2 Thus began
another episode in the long, tragic and bizarre history of the island of
Cyprus. Five days later, the actions of the Greeks led to counter-action by
the Turks in the form of a Turkish military invasion with some 40,000 men
and 300 tanks, bringing with them all the human sufferings and barbarities
of war.3
It is the purpose of this study to explore these actions of Greece and
Turkey from the standpoint of their legality or illegality according to the
principles of international law. Preceding a study of the international legal
aspects of the Cyprus crisis, a presentation of the history of the situation
becomes necessary.
I. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
Background. The island of Cyprus occupies a strategic position in the eastern
Mediterranean, five hundred miles from Greece but only forty miles from
Turkey. It has a total area of 3,572 square miles with a maximum length of
one hundred thirty-eight miles and a maximum width of fifty-nine miles. Of
its estimated population of 650,000, eighty percent speak Greek and follow
the Greek Orthodox religion, eighteen percent speak Turkish and are
Moslems. The remainder is made up of Armenians, Maronites and British.
Cypriot recorded history has been traced to the thirteenth century B.C.
when the first Greek colonization took place. Prior to the first century A.D.
* This Article was inspired by some of the issues raised at an International
Symposium on Cyprus sponsored by the Athens Panteios School of Political Science,
Athens, Greece, March 1-14, 1975, which the authors attended as guests of that school.
** B.A., University of Rochester; J.D., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University. Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist
University.
*** B.S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; LL.B., University of Texas;
LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan. William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitu-
tional Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, § 1, at 16, col. 2.
2. Id., July 18, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
3. Id., July 21, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
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it was ruled by Assyrians, Egyptians, Phonecians, Persians, Macedonians
and Romans. Byzantine rule followed that of Rome and in turn gave way to
a dynasty of crusaders which lasted until 1489 when the island was taken
over by the Venetians. Another change of sovereignty occurred in 1571
when the island was conquered by the Ottoman Turks, a rule which was to
continue for three hundred and seven years, and during which there emerged
the Turkish Cypriot community to exist side by side with the Greek speaking
community.4 Turkish rule ended in 1878 when Turkey agreed that Cyprus
should be occupied and administered by Great Britain as a base, thus facili-
tating British promises to protect the Ottoman Empire from Russian aggres-
sion." In November 1914, upon Turkey's entry into World War I on the
side of the Central Powers, the island was formally annexed by Britain, and
in 1925 it was made into a British crown colony.6
Following World War II, the British rulers were faced with more and
more cries for enosis-the right of Hellenic Cyprus to return to "Mother"
Greece. The countering force was Turkish insistence upon partition of the
island between Greece and Turkey to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority.
These demands led to civil strife fomented for the most part by a Greek
terrorist organization, EOKA, led by Archbishop Makarios and a Greek
Army Colonel, George Grivas. In 1957, after ten years of sporadic guerrilla
warfare, the British finally agreed to change the sovereign status of the
island. There was to be no enosis with Greece, nor any partition. Rather,
Cyprus was to become an independent nation. But its independence was to
be burdened with certain restrictions to allay the fears of the Turkish Cypriot
minority.7
In 1959, following long discussions with Archbishop Makarios, represent-
ing the Greek Cypriots, and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish
Cypriots, a tripartite meeting of representatives of the Greek Government,
the Turkish Government and the British Government drew up a new
Constitutions for the island and three important treaties, the Treaty of
Guarantee,0 the Treaty of Alliance,' ° and the Treaty of Establishment.1 '
At the end of the meeting, the Constitution and the treaties were presented
4. Ehrlich, Cyprus, the "Warlike Isle": Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis,
18 STAN. L. REv. 1021 (1966).
5. In the Turkish-British agreement there was a stipulation that Cyprus was to pay
to Turkey a yearly sum of 92,799 pounds, 11 shillings, and thruppence. This was such a
burden on the island's economy that for over 70 years the development of the country
was thwarted by lack of funds. For a discussion of the resolution of this problem see
Georghallides, The Commutation of Cyprus's Payment of the Turkish Debt Charge, 4
ENETHPIE 379 (1970-1971).
6. For a complete 4-volume history of Cyprus see G. HILL, A HMSTORY OF CYPRUS
(1952).
7. Turnbull, Cyprus and the British, 1 BRrrISH HISTORY ILLUSTRATED 52 (1974).
8. The Constitution is set forth in 3 A. PEASLEY, CONsTrrtTONS OF NATIONS-
EUROPE 138-221 (rev. 3d ed. 1968). For an excellent short discussion of these articles
see P. POLYviOU, CYPRUS, THE TRAGEDY AND THE CHALLENGE 16-33 (1975); Ehrlich,
supra note 4, at 1031-37.
9. Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 4, No. 5475.
10. Treaty of Alliance, set forth in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
CYPRUS: THE DISPUTE AND THE SETrLEMENTr 72-120 (1959).
11. Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Aug. 16, 1960,
382 U.N.T.S. 10, No. 5476.
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to both Cypriot community representatives who accepted all documents
with some reservations.
Under the Treaty of Guarantee the Republic of Cyprus undertook to
ensure its independence and to refrain from participation "in whole or in
part in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.' 2 The
other parties agreed to recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and undertook to prohibit
any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of
Cyprus with any other state or partition of the island. In the case of a breach
of this Treaty the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey agreed to consult
with respect to measures necessary to ensure its observance. The three
guaranteeing powers reserved the right, if concerted action was not possible,
to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs
established by the Treaty. The Treaty of Alliance called for Cypriot-Greek-
Turkish cooperation to defend the island against aggression, and the Treaty
of Establishment provided for British control and sovereignty over two
military bases. Greece and Turkey were also to maintain small military
contingents on the island, 950 Greek and 650 Turkish officers and men
respectively.13
The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were incorporated
into the Cypriot Constitution. The Constitution provided for a Greek Cypriot
President elected by the Greek Cypriot majority and a Turkish Cypriot Vice
President elected by the Turkish Cypriot minority. Each had a right of veto
over foreign affairs, defense and internal security. A Council of Ministers
composed of members from both communities in a 30%-70% ratio was to
be established by the respective communities, but with the stipulation that a
Turkish Cypriot official should hold one of the three important ministries:
foreign affairs, defense or finance. In addition, the Constitution guaranteed a
number of posts for the Turkish minority in the army (40%), the police force
(30%), and the civil service (30%). It called for a unicameral legislative
body of 50 members with a 70-30% ratio of Greek Cypriot to Turkish
Cypriot representatives. The minority community was also given legislative
and administrative autonomy in matters of personal estates, local taxation,
and control over religious, educational and cultural affairs.
With goodwill this solution might have worked; but, from the first, deep
suspicions divided the two communities. The Greek Cypriot majority felt that
the Constitution prohibited majority rule and fostered the maintenance of a
state within a state. The Turkish Cypriot minority feared that without such
constitutional guarantees they would have no rights at all. The two factions
grew increasingly uncooperative with each other, and in 1963 Archbishop
Makarios proposed constitutional changes to eliminate some of the privileges
of the Turkish Cypriot community and an abrogation of the Treaties of
Alliance and Guarantee. The Turkish Cypriots, sensing a grave threat to
their existence, rejected the changes, and almost immediately intercommunal
12. Treaty of Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 4, No. 5475.
13. Treaty of Alliance, set forth in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
CYPRUS: THE DIsPuTE AND THE SETTLEMENT 72-120 (1959).
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strife again broke out. Civil strife became endemic on the island with peak
periods of intensity in 1963-64 and in 1967. As a result of these upheavals,
many Turkish Cypriots abandoned their farms and villages and gathered for
self-protection in small enclaves.14
The strife on Cyprus led to a consideration of the problem by the Security
Council of the United Nations which eventually established a United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force on the island with a mandate to prevent fighting and to
contribute to the maintenance of law and order. However, the United
Nations forces were not able to prevent Turkish air attacks and bombings of
the island in 1964 which the Turks claimed were being carried out to protect
a Turkish Cypriot enclave under attack by Greek Cypriot troops.15 Nor was
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force able to prevent another outbreak of
hostilities in 1967.16
In April 1967 a military coup took place in Greece which had repercus-
sions on the Cypriot scene. Among the supporters of the Greek military
junta was the now General George Grivas who was the leader of the Greek
Cypriot National Guard, a force established by Makarios to circumvent the
constitutional requirements of minority representation in the Cypriot army
and police force. Grivas had never viewed an independent Cyprus as an
adequate substitute for enosis, and in defiance of both the United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force and orders from President Makarios, he sent a Nation-
al Guard patrol through a Turkish enclave. Shots were fired. The National
Guard opened an attack on the enclave. Two days of fighting elapsed before
the United Nations Force could achieve a cease-fire and force the National
Guard troops to withdraw from the beseiged area. There was an immediate
threat of invasion by Turkey unless Greece removed General Grivas and
withdrew all Greek forces from Cyprus in excess of those established by the
1959 agreements, and unless Makarios disbanded the National Guard.'7
The Greek Military Government, which was weak and unpopular at home
and abroad and in no state to go to war with Turkey, recalled General
Grivas, at least on a temporary basis. Although withdrawal of Greek forces
represented a major step away from enosis, the pressures from abroad were
so great that the troops were removed. Thereafter tensions on the island
abated to some extent, but the problems between the two Cypriot communi-
ties remained, as Makarios refused to disband his Greek Cypriot National
Guard.' 8
There continued to exist the problem of the Turkish Cypriot refugees who
had fled from their homes to Turkish enclaves for protection. These enclave
areas possessed insufficient resources to support the increased populations
14. L. MILLER, CYPRUS: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF CivIL STRIFE 9-10 (1967).
15. Secretary General, Report to the Security Council Concerning the Situation in
Cyprus, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1964, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/5516 (1964).
16. Secretary General, Report to the Security Council Concerning the Situation in
Cyprus, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1967, at 215, U.N. Doc. S/8248 (1967).
17. Duncan-Jones, The Civil War in Cyprus, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
CIVIL WARS 148 (E. Luard ed. 1972).
18. Id. at 155.
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and depended upon Turkish economic aid for maintenance. In the words of
a Turkish Cypriot spokesman:
There were 50,000 Cypriots in the Greek sector in daily fear of their
lives seeking asylum in the Turkish region of Cyprus. More than 20,-
000 were new refugees who had all their property looted by Greek
gunmen. For the last 11 years, 24,000 Turkish Cypriots had been liv-
ing as displaced persons in temporary refugee accommodations under
unhygenic conditions and every time the Turkish community applied
for rehabilitation, the reply of the Greek Cypriot administration was
that the problem could not be solved before a political solution of the
Cyprus question was reached.19
After the 1967 incidents, the Greek Cypriots no longer presented a united
front. President Makarios, having abandoned the idea of enosis in favor of
an unfettered independent state, was opposed by right wing Cypriot extrem-
ists who re-established the pre-independence terrorist organization, now
called EOKA-B, and facilitated the clandestine return of General Grivas in
1971. There were numerous plots and attempts to assassinate Makarios, and
there were several clashes between the members of EOKA-B and pro-
Makarios Greek Cypriots. 20
In early July 1974, Makarios demanded that the military junta in Greece
recall the 650 Greek officers who had remained in Cyprus to train and
command the National Guard. He complained that these Greek officers and
their EOKA-B friends were planning to overthrow his government. Exactly
ten days later the coup and attempted assassination took place. 21 The Greek
officers established a new Cypriot Government headed by Nicos Sampson, an
EOKA-B leader. The elevation of Sampson to head of state indicated to the
Turks that enosis was about to take place and triggered the Turkish invasion
of Cyprus to assure that no such union would occur.22 The Turkish invasion
raised the grim specter of war between Turkey and Greece, a war for which
Greece was not prepared. In turn this so unsettled political conditions in
Greece that the military government was ousted, and Constantine Karaman-
lis was recalled from exile to form a Greek government of national unity.
With the collapse of the Greek military junta came the collapse of the
Sampson regime, and the taking over of the Cyprus Government by Acting
President Glafcos Clerides who held office until Makarios returned to the
island in December 1974.23
However justified may have been the original Turkish invasion, there was
little justification for the resumption of hostilities after the initial cease-fire
demanded by the United Nations Security Council on July 22, at which time
the Turkish forces had established a wedge from the port of Kyrenia to the
capital, Nicosia. But the Turks continued to reinforce the military units on
19. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec. 1974, at 28.
20. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
21. Id., July 17, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
22. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec. 1974, at 28.
23. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1974, § 1, at 9, col 1.
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the island and continued to expand the width of the Kyrenia-Nicosia
corridor. 24
On July 26, the three guarantor governments met in Geneva in an attempt
to resolve the problems which arose from these interventions. Agreement was
reached on the implementation of the cease-fire and on the establishment of
a demarcation line separating opposing forces.25 Political issues were left in
temporary abeyance to be taken up later in Geneva on August 8. At that
time the Turks presented a demand that Cyprus should remain an independ-
ent nation but it should be composed of two federated states, one Greek
Cypriot and the other Turkish Cypriot, each state to have full autonomy
within its borders. The area of the Turkish Cypriot state would encompass
34% of the territory of the island, despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot
population comprised only 18% of the whole. The 34% demand was based
on the assertion by the Turks that Turkish Cypriots had owned at least that
amount of the island before being dispossessed of territory under the last ten
years of the Makarios regime. As an alternative to this federal proposal, the
Turks also offered a cantonal system which would contemplate the occupa-
tion of several cantons by Turkish Cypriots. These proposals were unpalata-
ble to both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots, and the conference broke
down on August 14.26 The same day the Turkish army marched across the
entire northern portion of Cyprus until its forces occupied 40% of the island,
including some of its most productive territory. On February 13, 1975, the
Turkish Government issued a declaration on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots
proclaiming the establishment of a Federated Turkish Cypriot State in the
Turkish occupied area. Thus, Turkey did by arms what she had failed to
accomplish by diplomacy.
Some 200,000 Greek Cypriots, or about 40% of the Greek Cypriot popu-
lation, who were living in the area the Turks occupied, were obliged to leave
their homes and take refuge in other parts of the country. The economic life
of the island became a shambles and massive international aid was required
to keep the people of Cyprus from starving. 27 There can be little doubt that
grave atrocities occurred on both sides. But as soon as Greek Cypriot
atrocities came to light, Acting President Clerides immediately agreed to an
independent investigation by the United Nations or by the International Red
Cross and condemned with abhorrence all such acts. He challenged the Turks
to permit the United Nations and the Red Cross to investigate their acts of
atrocity but permission was refused.28 The Turks violated a number of
international rules concerning the conduct of hostilities, particularly those
rules and regulations which deal with humanitarian treatment of the people
24. Id., July 24, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
25. Id., July 29, 1974, § 1, at 5, col. 9.
26. Id., Aug. 15, 1974, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
27. Cyprus Public Information Office, Nicosia, The Economic Consequences of the
Turkish Invasion of Cyprus (Oct. 1974).
28. P. POLYVIOu, supra note 8, at 192. See also 11 U.N. MONTHLY ClONicLE Dec.
1974, at 31; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CRISIS ON CYPRUS:
A STUDY MISsiONREPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE SURCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE
PROBLEMS CONNECTED wITH REFUOEES AND ESCAPEES 23 (1974).
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of occupied territory, and the prohibitions against looting, plundering, and
forced expulsion of inhabitants from their homes. 29
The Greek Cypriots described the underlying purpose of the Turkish
invasion and occupation as being one "to eliminate the indigenous population
and colonize the occupied territory with Turks from the mainland of Turkey,
to be supplemented by Turks from Cyprus." 80 It has also been claimed that
with the world-wide depression, Turkish workers who had been working in
the European common market countries were returning to Turkey, and in
order to prevent internal domestic problems, farming land in Cyprus former-
ly belonging to Greek Cypriots was to be turned over to them.8'
The United States' Role. The United States policy with respect to Cyprus has
been dismal at best. The objectives of this nation have been mainly to
preserve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to which both
Greece and Turkey belong, and to this end to attempt the difficult task of
maintaining a reasonably friendly relationship between Greece and Tur-
key.832 With American NATO bases in both Turkey and Greece, a tranquil
Cyprus was necessary if these bases were to be used to their full effectiveness
in any emergency which might threaten either or both of these NATO
nations. But even with these considerations a harmonious relationship be-
tween Turkey and Greece in NATO was almost impossible of achievement.
Nothing dissipated the latent animosity between these two neighbors.
Any overtures made by the United States to suggest solutions were
regarded with great suspicion by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. This atmo-
sphere of suspicion has been heightened by the conspiratorial theory of
international politics which perceives the CIA as being omnipresent and
omnipotent in the political affairs of all three nations. It has been alleged
that the CIA has manipulated the internal and foreign policies in all three
nations, created unrest and deposed governments at will.88 Such accusations
were based on the claim that the CIA from the moment of Cypriot
independence had conspired to obtain American bases on the island for
strategic use in Middle Eastern affairs. The Turks claimed that the CIA
was responsible for establishing the military regime in Athens in 1967, and
that back in 1964 it had prevented Turkey from carrying out an amphibious
operation against Cyprus. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots claimed that the
rash attempt of the Greek colonels to grab power in Cyprus in July 1974
was actually planned and instigated by the CIA, and when it failed in its
objective, the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops was encouraged by the
Agency. This undocumented charge was deduced from the fact that the
American Mediterranean fleet did nothing to stop the invasion.84 On the
29. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw-DIsPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 405,
436, 438, 451, 513 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
30. 11 U.N. MoNTmy CHRoNiCLE, Dec. 1974, at 11.
31. Address by G. Tenekides, The Athens Panteios School of Political Science,
International Symposium on Cyprus, March 10-14, 1975.
32. F. BEER, INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN NATO 17 (1969).
33. G. HARRIS, TROUBLED ALLIANCE: TURKISH AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN ISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, 1945-1971, at 139 (1972); N.Y. Times, May 3, 1967, § 3, at 1, col. 8.
34. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
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part of Turkey, the fact that on February 5, 1975, Congress cut off military
aid to Turkey when it invaded Cyprus was seen as further evidence of
American determination, one way or another, to dominate Turkish political
life on the national as well as the international level s.3
Actually from 1963 onward the United States was rather wary of injecting
itself into the forefront of any dispute on Cyprus for fear of alienating either
Greece or Turkey. Nevertheless on June 5, 1964, when Turkey was on the
verge of invading Cyprus, President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Ismet
Ifiofu, the Prime Minister of Turkey, expressing grave concern over Turkish
plans. He stated: "I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot
agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for the
Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. '3 6 The Johnson
letter was effective in averting the planned military action of the Turks at
that time but created a sharp division in Turkish-American relations as it
was viewed by many in Turkey as an intervention in that nation's sovereign
affairs.3 7
Later in June 1964 President Johnson met separately with Greek Prime
Minister George Rapandreon and Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Iiiofiu and
suggested that talks on the Cyprus issue be held at Geneva under the aegis of
the United Nations mediator with the participation of Dean Acheson, the
former United States Secretary of State. Again the Cyprus Government was
not invited to participate. Acheson drew up a plan which called for the union
of Cyprus with Greece in exchange for cession of the tiny Greek island of
Castelarizon to Turkey, and provided that two Turkish cantons be estab-
lished on Cyprus, that a Cypriot military base be ceded to Turkey, and that
compensation be paid to those Turkish Cypriots who wished to emigrate to
Turkey. The plan was immediately denounced by Makarios and led to
another outbreak of fighting on Cyprus in which Turkey resorted to air
strikes against the Greek Cypriot community. The Acheson Plan increased
anti-Americanism not only in Turkey but also in Cyprus and Greece. Thus
in August 1964 the Acheson mission came to an unsuccessful close.3 8
After the military coup in Greece in April 1967 the United States was
again caught in an uneasy position between the two NATO allies. This time
President Johnson dispatched Cyrus Vance as his personal representative to
attempt to promote a settlement between Greece and Turkey and to counsel
peaceful negotiations. At the same time the Secretary General of the United
Nations appointed his Special Representative to help solve the crisis, and the
Secretary General of NATO offered his good offices. All three men worked
closely together to obtain the tentative agreement that Greece would pull out
35. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1975, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
36. Letter from Lyndon Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Iflofu, June 5,
1964, in 20 MIDDLE EAST J. 386 (1966). See also T. EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967:
INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 83 (1974).
37. J. DAVIDs, THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS-1964, at 53-67 (1965); G.
HARRIS, supra note 33, at 118; Roos, Roos & Field, Students and Politics in Turkey,
97 DAEDALUS 184, 193 (1968).
38. Acheson, Cyprus: The Anatomy of the Problem, 46 CHIcAGo BAR REcoRD 349(1965).
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its troops illegally stationed on the island, Turkey would disband its invasion
force and the Cypriot National Guard would be reduced. But Makarios
refused to consent to any bilateral effort between Greece and Turkey to bind
him.3 9 Nevertheless the situation was defused until 1974. But in all three
nations anti-Americanism continued to flourish and grow, posing a continu-
ing and serious challenge to the NATO alliance.
All of these factors may have influenced Washington not to take a
stronger stand against the 1974 Turkish invasion. Moreover, the 1974
Cyprus crisis began at the time of the collapse of the Nixon presidency, and
American foreign policy seemed to be virtually suspended during the most
crucial days of the crisis. Following the Turkish invasion the Department of
State made a rather feeble attempt to find a common ground between
Greece and Turkey in an effort to save NATO's southeastern defenses, but it
ran into formidable obstacles posed by all three governments whose view on
the ultimate solution for Cyprus remained as far apart as ever. The net result
of Washington's efforts or lack of efforts has been an alienation of all three
nations. The Karamanlis government which took over from the military junta
in Greece was so unhappy with American failure to stop the Turkish
invasion that the Government withdrew Greek military units from NATO.
And in April 1975 the Greeks withdrew permission for the United States
Sixth Fleet to use the harbor of Elefsis, seventeen miles west of Athens.
Various other American facilities were shut down, such as the airbase at
Hellinikon operated by the Air Transport Command, the ballistic missile
range and the telecommunications base in Crete, air and naval facilities at
Suda Bay in Crete, naval communications bases at Marathon near Athens,
and an artillery base near Salonika. It pared down the privileges, immunities
and exemptions formerly granted to American personnel, and declared that
the remaining five American installations in Greece were to be placed under
Greek commanders. 40
As for Turkey, it was so angered by the congressional arms embargo that
in February 1975 it prohibited any ships of the Sixth Fleet to drop anchor in
either Istanbul or Ismir.41 President Ford sought to obtain congressional
permission to resume military aid to Ankara, but Congress has been
reluctant to lift the ban. It has been claimed that the ban on Turkish aid was
pushed through Congress by an alliance of the small, potent Greek lobby and
the large, potent Israeli lobby. These two lobbies were so effective that even
the Turkish threat of closing down highly sensitive American bases along the
Turkish Soviet border could not persuade Congress to reconsider its decision.
Furthermore, the President was warned that any congressional debate on the
repeal would make Turkey the whipping boy, stirring up even harsher anti-
American feelings among the Turks. 42
39. T. EHRLICH, supra note 36, at 111-12.
40. TIME, May 12, 1975, at 35; N.Y. Times, March 9, 1975, § 4, at 4, Col. 3; id.,
April 20, 1975, § 4, at 17, col. 1; id., May 11, 1975, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
41. Time, May 12, 1975, at 35.
42. Evans & Novak, Ethnic Policies Growing Menace, Sherman Democrat, April 10,
1975, at 8, col. 7.
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The Turkish military and diplomatic experts drew up various contingency
plans in the event that no congressional repeal came into being. The United
States had maintained more than twenty military installations in Turkey,
many of which were considered to be of vital importance to the western
alliance. Failure of Congress to lift the arms ban in spite of pleas by the Ford
Administration brought about the threatened Turkish retaliation in July
1975. The Turks assumed control over all American military bases and
suspended all American military operations. Premier Suleyman Demirel of
Turkey even rejected the offer of a fifty million dollar grant of weapons by
President Ford in return for reopening the bases. Ford had offered the arms
grant under legislation which permitted him to provide arms to friendly
nations when the executive branch considered such aid absolutely vital to the
national security.43 The Turks refused the grant on the basis thai they were
unwilling in principle to accept as a gift what they were quite willing and
able to pay for. 44 The Turks claimed that the congressional arms embargo
which not only halted military aid to Turkey but also banned the sale of
military hardware on a commercial basis violated its common defense
agreements with the United States which commits the United States to supply
military equipment to its NATO allies. 45 Even if the arms embargo should
be removed, the relationship between Ankara and Washington will probably
not be the same because Turkish domestic politics would rule out reopening
all of the bases. Such bases as the Turks would consider essential to the
NATO alliance might be reopened but under NATO rather than American
control.46
In an attempt to alleviate some of the strains in the relationship of the
United States with its two NATO allies, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
met in Austria in March 1975 with the Greek Foreign Minister, Dinitrios
Bitsios, and made a short visit to Ankara for talks with the Turkish Foreign
Minister. 47 Thereafter he proposed that further negotiations looking toward
a settlement of the problem be resumed under the auspices of the United
Nations Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. Dr. Waldheim suggested that the
talks should start in Rome between April 10 and 13. The Turkish Cypriots
accepted these proposals and also approved of Vienna as an additional
venue for consideration. Both of these locations were at first unacceptable to
the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots who wanted negotiations to be held
either in New York City, where there is a large vocal Greek-American
population, or in Geneva or Paris, where Greek Cypriots have diplomatic
representatives. This counter proposal was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots
on the basis of the General Assembly Resolution 3212 which provided that
talks between the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot
43. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
44. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1975, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
45. 112 Manchester Guardian Weekly No. 10, March 8, 1975, at 12, col. 4; The
Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
46. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 2.




community be "on an equal footing. ' 48 It was claimed that since the Turkish
Cypriot community did not have diplomatic missions abroad, acceptance of
the Greek demand of resuming the talks at a capital where Greek Cypriots
had a diplomatic mission would be against the "equal footing" principle.
Under pressure from the United Nations, the Greeks finally agreed to
Vienna as a negotiating site, and negotiations between Mr. Glafkos Clerides
for the Greek Cypriots and Mr. Raf Denktash for Turkish Cypriots began
in that city on Monday, April 28, 1975. 41
Great Britian's Role. The British policy toward Cyprus since it granted the
island its independence can be described as confused and haphazard. When,
in December 1963, the United Nations Security Council was requested to
meet in emergency session to discuss the raging civil strife on Cyprus and the
apparent imminent threat of invasion by Turkey, Britain requested a delay
of the meeting in order to give the British a chance to attempt to ameliorate
the situation. An armed British force was established with orders to help
restore order on the island, and the British called a conference in London in
an attempt to resolve the crisis through peaceful negotiation.50 This confer-
ence was a failure in all respects. Britain would not agree with Makarios that
the Constitution had been foisted upon Cyprus and could no longer be
considered binding, nor would it agree with Turkey that Turkey should
invade the island under the Treaty of Guarantee. The British suggested that a
NATO peacekeeping force be allowed to replace the British, but Makarios
insisted that if an international force were to be sent to Cyprus it should be
under the auspices of the United Nations.5"
Upon the failure of the London Conference, the British Government
requested an early meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Cyprus
issue. Britain laid the problem before the United Nations as a final resort,
only when all other attempts at peacekeeping and negotiation had failed, and
when Britain itself was no longer interested in continued bearing of the
expense necessary to control the situation.
The Cyprus Issue and the United Nations. After much debate, the Security
Council on March 4, 1964, passed a resolution calling upon all members to
refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in
the Republic of Cyprus or endanger international peace. The resolution
requested the Government of Cyprus to take all necessary measures to
maintain law and order and stop violence and bloodshed. It recommended
the creation of a peacekeeping force under United Nations auspices and the
appointment of a United Nations mediator to attempt to resolve the issues. 52
48. G.A. Res. 3212, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
49. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1975, § 1, at 46, col. 1; id., April 29, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 6;
id. May 11, 1975, § 4, at 3, col. 1.
50. C. FOLEY, LEGAcY OF STRIF 168 (1964); J. STEGENGA, THE UNITED NATIONS
FORCE IN CYPRUS 35-36 (1968); Psomiades, The Cyprus Dispute, 48 CURRENT HISTORY
269 (1965).
51. L. MILLER, supra note 14, at 47; Duncan-Jones, supra note 17, at 149; Gordon,
The U.N. in Cyprus, 19 INT'L J. 326, 332 (1964); TIME, Feb. 21, 1964, at 34.
52. 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1964, at 102, U.N. Doe. S/5575 (1964); 19
U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1964, at 105, U.N. Doe. S/5679 (1964).
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As the financing of the peacekeeping force had to be met by the
governments providing the contingents, most governments who were in a
position to provide such a force were reluctant to undertake such a task.
Apparently the Security Council resolution had been passed upon the
assumption that the United States would foot the bill, but the United States
refused. The Secretary General made personal appeals for voluntary contri-
butions from likely countries, and eventually he obtained sufficient financial
support to cover the initial costs. 5 3 Even then there were problems related to
the qualifications required of such a force. The Greek Cypriot Government
was unwilling to allow African or communist troops or troops of a NATO
power to come to the island. While Secretary General U Thant desperately
sought out satisfactory forces, the British announced that unless a United
Nations force arrived quickly they would withdraw all their troops to their
sovereign bases on the island. The Turks, of course, became increasingly
impatient with the inaction. But eventually, by March 27, 1964, the United
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) became operational with Canadian,
Irish, Swedish and Finnish troops.5 4
The functions of UNFICYP which the Security Council resolution of
March 4, 1964, established were to prevent recurrence of fighting, to
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of law and order, and to
return the island to normal conditions. This ambiguous mandate permitted
each side to interpret it in terms favorable to itself. The Makarios govern-
ment viewed the mandate as putting the force at its disposal to crush
domestic rebellion and to restore "order." The Turkish Cypriots viewed it as
a mandate of UNFICYP to return to the ante bellum normalcy of 1963. The
Greek Cypriots insisted that "normal" meant a unified, unitary state with
majority rule which was "normal" in democratic nations. 55 No clarification
on these contentions came from the Security Council and hence the Secretary
General established his own guide lines for the UNFICYP role. He stated
that the troops could shoot in self-defense only and that they could not take
any action which was likely to bring them into direct conflict with either
Greek or Turkish Cypriots except to protect themselves or to avert violations
of arrangements previously accepted by both communities. The force was not
to serve the special interests of any community, group or interest in Cyprus.
It was not to be an arm of the Makarios government, nor was it to serve
Turkish Cypriot aims of reinstating the 1960 Constitution or securing a de
facto partition. The mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting was to be
fulfilled by interposing the United Nations troops between two belligerents
and by patiently working to reduce tensions and confrontations. The man-
date to restore and maintain law and order was not the law and order of the
1960 Constitution, nor the law and order of the Makarios regime, but rather
to assist in the protection of life and property against violence from any
source. And the duty to return to normal conditions did not mean either the
53. J. STEGENGA, supra note 50, at 73; Duncan-Jones, supra note 17, at 151.
54. J. STEGENGA, supra note 50, at 77; Gordon, supra note 51, at 340.
55. J. STEGENGA, supra note 50, at 102-19; Duncan-Jones, supra note 17, at 152.
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pre-December 1963 constitutional normality, nor the normality of a unitary
government ruled by the Greek Cypriot majority, nor the normality of a
federal government with two distinct states. It meant rather, that day-to-day
life on Cyprus be returned to normal. Thus the UNFICYP was used merely
to establish calm, stability and normal daily living. The greater problem of a
lasting settlement was the assigned province of the United Nations Mediator
working with all parties, not UNFICYP.5 6
The first United Nations Mediator, Finnish diplomat Sakari Tuomioja,
died in August 1964, and was replaced by Galo Plaza, a former president of
Ecuador. Galo Plaza reported to the United Nations in March 1965., 7 After
summarizing the background of the crisis and the rigid positions of all sides,
he set forth certain personal proposals which he felt should guide subsequent
discussions. He made five key suggestions: (1) any political settlement
should be arranged by the two Cypriot communities first and only then
ratified by the mainland governments rather than the reverse as had been
the case in 1959; (2) the restrictive treaties should be abrogated or at least
modified; (3) the principle of self-determination, and by extension the
majority's right to opt for enosis, should be recognized, but the majority
should agree voluntarily to refrain from exercising the enosis option; (4) the
federal form of government that the Turkish Cypriot community desired was
both impractical and undesirable as it would necessitate population resettle-
ment and might lead to increased pressure for partition of the island; (5) the
Turkish Cypriot community should be willing to trade its disproportionate
blocking power for constitutional and international safeguards of its legiti-
mate rights.
The Greek Cypriot leaders agreed with all points except that they should
voluntarily renounce enosis merely to reassure the Turkish Cypriot commu-
nity. But the Turkish Cypriot community rejected 'the report immediately as
totally unacceptable even as a basis for discussion. Furthermore, they
demanded that Galo Plaza be replaced. In spite of efforts of the Secretary
General to defend Plaza's initiative, the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots
refused to deal with him and he eventually resigned. He was not replaced,
and official United Nations mediation was abandoned for the time being.5s
In 1968 leaders of the two Cypriot communities again resorted to
discussions in an effort to resolve their differences. But by 1971 these talks
had arrived at a deadlock which could not be overcome without some new
impetus. The Secretary General of the United Nations suggested that the
56. 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1964, at 12, U.N. Doc. S/5653 (1964).
57. 20 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1965, at 199, U.N. Doc. S/6253 (1965).
58. Plaza finally submitted his resignation .... His plan for Cyprus made
excellent sense-indeed the future he foresaw for the island, as an inde-
pendent unitary state, but with real safeguards guaranteed by the UN for
the minority, is that which the parties themselves have more or less come
round to now-but his job was to mediate, not to judge. He failed to
take into account the realities of the situation. It may have been the ideal
solution in theory, but it was not at that time a possible one; and no
solution, however sensible in theory, is any good without the agreement
of the parties to the dispute.
Duncan-Jones, supra note 17, at 164.
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talks be enlarged to include the Secretary General's Special Representative,
and that the Greek and Turkish Governments should each make available a
constitutional expert to attend the talks in an advisory capacity. The role of
the Special Representative was merely that of good offices exercised on the
Secretary General's behalf and with no intention that he should act as a
mediator or put forth substantive proposals concerning solutions to the
problem.5 9 This suggestion was acted upon, although little progress was
made up to the moment when the Greek junta attempted the assassination of
Makarios which spurred the eventual Turkish invasion of the island.
As one of the three powers that guaranteed the security of the Republic of
Cyprus it would seem that the British, with troops available on their bases on
Cyprus, could have done more to discourage Turkish invasion. Immediately
following the coup the Turkish Prime Minister flew to London to consult
with the British about the situation. No authoritative reports of the results of
this consultation exist, but apparently some assurance of British non-action
must have been given, for shortly thereafter the Turkish troops invaded the
island. If the British could not have persuaded the Turks against taking this
step, it would seem they could have at least prevented Turkey's expansion of
the occupation after the initial landing and the cease-fire had gone into
effect. Britain had a large force on the island and could have reinforced the
small body of UNFICYP troops which unsuccessfully attempted to stop the
two sides from fighting. The British claimed that strategic consideration
involving British domestic politics, overextended commitments abroad, and
NATO considerations prevented her from so doing.60
Following the Turkish invasion, a great many Turks still living in Greek
Cypriot areas fled to the British bases for protection. In September of 1974
the Turks suggested that these refugees be sent to the Turkish mainland,
presumably intending to return them thereafter to the Turkish occupied area
of Cyprus. At that time, the British refused, pointing out that the Greek
Cypriot Government was prepared to extend every guarantee and safeguard
concerning the safe return of the Turkish Cypriots to their homes in the
Greek Cypriot portion, including international supervision. In spite of these
guarantees, less than a thousand of the ten thousand Turkish Cypriots on the
British bases left voluntarily. Thus, in January 1975 the British agreed to
transfer the refugees to the Turkish mainland. There were angry reactions
from the Greek Cypriot community which viewed such action as a violation
of the Treaty of Establishment by the British. That Treaty contained an
express prohibition against the use of the bases for civilian airports. By
transporting by air the civilian refugees to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots
believed that the British were in effect converting the bases into airports for
civilian use. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots viewed this airlift as an act of
intervention in Cypriot affairs, and hence violative of the non-intervention
principle of international law. The British countered with the response that
59. Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. IA, at 28-30, U.N. Doc. A/8401 (1971).
60. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 6; P. PoLxviou, supra note 8, at 215.
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the airlift was carried out for purely humanitarian reasons, for the refugees
were living under canvas in severe winter weather and were suffering from
cold and disease."'
When the government of Archbishop Makarios was overthrown by the
Greeks, the Secretary General of the United Nations requested the Security
Council to meet so he could keep them apprized of what was occurring on
the island.62 The Council considered the situation for two weeks and
adopted eight resolutions on the Cyprus problem calling upon all states to
respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and
demanding an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Repub-
lic. The withdrawal of all foreign military personnel without delay was
requested.63 The General Assembly of the United Nations also debated the
Cyprus situation in November 1974 and in its resolution, among other things,
requested the Secretary General to continue to lend his good offices to the
parties concerned, expressed the hope that further negotiations under United
Nations auspices would take place, and recommended that the negotiations
take place on an equal footing between the representatives of the two
communities in order to reach a mutually acceptable political settlement
based on their fundamental and legitimate rights. Both bodies called upon all
parties to continue to cooperate fully with the peacekeeping force on
Cyprus, and both bodies expressed the hope that the refugees could return to
their homes in safety.64
Following the unilateral establishment of the Federated Turkish Cypriot
State in February 1975, the government of Archbishop Makarios requested
and again obtained a series of meetings of the United Nations Security
Council on the grounds that Turkey had violated the resolutions of the
General Assembly and Security Council, and, moreover, that the Turkish
declaration was a prelude to a Turkish Cypriot separatist move.65
Mr. Vedat A. Celik was invited to speak to the Security Council as a
representative of the Turkish Cypriots. He denied the Greek Cypriot allega-
tion stating that the proclamation of the Federated Turkish State of Cyprus
was a purely internal reorganization of the autonomous Turkish administra-
tion. It was not a unilateral declaration of independence, nor was it an
autonomous state, so it did not run counter to any United Nations resolution,
all of which had reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity or indepen-
dence of Cyprus. Nor could it be considered as violative of the Constitution
of Cyprus because, according to Mr. Celik, that document had been destroyed
by Archbishop Makarios in December 1963. Moreover, after his return to
Cyprus in December 1974, Archbishop Makarios had further defied the
61. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1975, § 1, at 10, col. 7; P. POLYviOU, supra note 8, at 215.
62. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug-Sept. 1974, at 3, 4.
63. S.C. Res. 353, 29 U.N. SCOR, 1781st meeting 7 (1974); S.C. Res. 354, 29 U.N.
SCOR, 1783rd meeting 7 (1974); S.C. Res. 355, 29 U.N. SCOR, 1789th meeting 8
(1974); S.C. Res. 357, 29 U.N. SCOR, 1792nd meeting 8 (1974); S.C. Res. 358, 29
U.N. SCOR, 1793rd meeting 8 (1974); S.C. Res. 359, 29 U.N. SCOR, 1793rd meeting 8
(1974); S.C. Res. 360, 29 U.N. SCOR, 1794th meeting 9 (1974); S.C. Res. 361, 29 U.N.
SCOR, 1795th meeting 9 (1974).
64. G.A. Res. 3212, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974).
65. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONcLE, March 1975, at 3.
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Constitution by setting up a National Council to further "the national cause"
and had formed a new cabinet constituted purely of Greek Cypriots. 6  He
went on to maintain that experience had proven that the two national
communities could not live peacefully together and that the only way to
bring peace and quiet to the island was for them to live side by side in a
biregional federation free to develop and prosper without pressure, discrimi-
nation or domination of one by the other. The Turkish Cypriot spokesman
also declared that the statehood proclamation did not preclude' further
negotiations between the two communities looking toward an equitable
solution of the problem. The only two principles that were not negotiable
were: (1) Cyprus must become a biregional and bicommunal federation,
and (2) existing guarantees provided for in international agreements must
be maintained.6 7
In this new series of debates the representative of the Makarios govern-
ment, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, offered to dismantle the National Guard and to
hand over its arms to an enlarged UNFICYP and agreed to expansion of
that force by addition of non-aligned contingents, Moslem contingents and
others, provided that Turkery would in turn withdraw its 40,000 troops. The
Turks refused on the grounds that within the Greek Cypriot sector there
existed at least two well-armed secret armies which even Makarios could not
control. Hence, merely dismantling the National Guard would not assure the
safety of the Turkish Cypriot community.68
After four weeks of debate and private consultation, the Security Council
adopted a new resolution in March 1975,69 requesting that Secretary
General Waldheim use his good offices to restore negotiations between the
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, and that these negotiations be
pressed forward under his personal auspices and with his direction as
appropriate. The resolution reaffirmed support for Cyprus sovereignty, inde-
pendence, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and asked all states to
respect them. It specified that no attempt should be made to partition the
island or to unite it to another country. The resolution also asked for swift
execution of earlier United Nations decisions on Cyprus which included calls
for the prompt withdrawal of foreign troops and for the safe return of
refugees to their homes. The Security Council expressed regret at the Turkish
Cypriot Federated State move as tending to compromise negotiations, the
aim of which, it said, must be a freely agreed settlement. Glafkos Clerides of
Cyprus indicated his dissapointment that the resolution did not set a deadline
for troop withdrawal and for refugee return, but promised his government's
full cooperation. Mr. Celik, the Turkish Cypriot spokesman, said he could
not accept the resolution as it stood because of a reference to the Govern-
ment of Cyprus, an entity which could speak only for the Greek Cypriots.
Nevertheless, he pledged full corporation with Secretary General Kurt Wald-
heim in his efforts to revive negotiations between the two communities. 70
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 8, 9, 11, 12, 14.
68. Id. at 5, 6, 10, 14.
69. S.C. Res. 367, 30 U.N. SCOR, 1820th meeting (1975).
70. U.N. Weekly News Summary, Press Release WS/701, March 14, 1975, at 2.
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Under the chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary General, Mr.
Glafkos Clerides of the Greek Cypriot community and Mr. Rauf Denktash
of the Turkish Cypriot community met in eight closed sessions in the old
Hapsburg imperial palace in Vienna the last days of April and the first days
of May 1975. During these conferences, each kept in touch with the Greek
and Turkish Governments respectively, but neither of these Governments
participated at the conference. The final communique indicated that the two
leaders had agreed to establish a joint panel to study their opposing
proposals for an eventual central government. The negotiators also agreed in
principle to reopen the Nicosia airport which had been closed since the
Turkish invasion in July 1974, but were unable to agree on how it should be
reopened. Mr. Denktash demanded half of the management positions at the
airport, a demand which Mr. Clerides rejected. The two men failed to come
to any understanding on the future of the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus, and
the removal of the 40,000 Turkish troops. Furthermore the difficulties of
reaching a settlement were magnified by the publication in a Turkish Cypriot
magazine of a new Constitution for the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.
This Constitution was taken by the Greek Cypriot leaders as an indication of
a further hardening of Turkey's attitude toward any reasonable solution of
the problem.
Although denied by both sides at the conference, Greek-Turkish problems
in other areas have influenced the search for a just and equitable solution of
the Cyprus issue. There are a complex of Greek-Turkish disagreements in
existence, including the delimitation of the continental shelf for oil rights,
and the demilitarization of border zones. In any event, the two parties
agreed to meet again in June and July 1975 for further discussions. 7'
During these meetings some slight progress on humanitarian issues was
made. The leaders of the opposing Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities
agreed that the 9,000 Turks remaining in the Greek area of the island would
be permitted to go to the Turkish section if they wished, and the 10,000
Greek Cypriots still in the Turkish controlled northern section would be
permitted to remain there if they desired with assurances of a normal life, or
they could move to the south of their own free will. The United Nations
Peace-Keeping Force on Cyprus was to supervise the transfer and was given
guarantees of free access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the
Turkish Cypriot sector. Discussions continued over the powers and functions
of a federal government, the Turkish Cypriot proposals for a transitional
government, and the delimitation of the future ethnic zones. But decisions on
these matters were postponed until further meetings under United Nations
auspices could be held in New York in September 1975.72
II. LEGAL ASPECTS
Greek Action. The 1974 coup d'itat staged by the Greek military govern-
ment in Cyprus was a clearcut case of illegal intervention, whereby Greece
71. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1975, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
72. U.N. Weekly News Summary, Press Release WS/722, August 8, 1975, at 2.
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sought to impose her will upon the internal affairs of Cyprus for the purpose
of altering the conditions therein. This act was an encroachment upon the
sovereign prerogative of Cyprus, to her internal independence, since each
state has the right to adopt and organize its own government as it sees fit,
free from pressures and compulsions from other states.73 A 1965 resolution
of the General Assembly would cover the Greek interference:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently armed intervention and all other forms of interference
or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements are condemned;
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it -the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to
secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize,
assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of an-
other State, or interfere in civil strife in another state . . .74
The Greek intervention also falls within the rubric of "aggression"-
delictual conduct which violates the right of territorial integrity or political
independence or sovereignty of a state, thus placing the security of the state
in danger. 75 Attempts to overthrow governments by armed force, by terroris-
tic methods of assassination of its leaders, would certainly fall within the
meaning of aggression. 70 Even the rather restricted General Assembly
definition of aggression would encompass the situation.77 Article 2 declares
that a first use of armed force in contravention of the United Nations Charter
is prima facie evidence of aggression. Article 3(a) then classifies an attack
by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state as
aggression. More directly applicable, however, is article 3(e) which states
that "[t]he use of armed forces of one State, which are within the territory
of another state with the agreement of the receiving State in contravention of
the conditions provided for in the agreement . . ." shall qualify as an act of
aggression. The Greek officers charged with the coup were in Cyprus to train
and command its National Guard, not to overthrow its Government. 78
Attempts to overthrow a government by assassination of the head of a
state have been called aggression by an international organization. In 1960
the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States found that
governmental officials of the Dominican Republic had been engaged in a
73. On the principle of intervention and its meaning at international law see A.V.W.
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAw AND ITS IMPORT IN THE
AMERICAS 67-78 (1956).
74. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965)
(emphasis added) (as set forth in 54 DEPT. STATE BULL. 128-29 (1966)).
75. On the principle of aggression and its meaning at international law see A.V.W.
THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1972).
76. Id. at 66-67.
77. G.A. Res. 3314 (1974), set forth in 72 DEPT. STATE BULL. 158-60 (1975).
78. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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plot to overthrow the Government of Venezuela which included the attempt
on the life of the President of that country as well as providing arms for the
coup. The Domincan Republic was condemned as having committed acts of
intervention and aggression. Collective enforcement measures to be taken by
the other American Republics against the Dominican Republic were or-
dered. 79
The Greek action in Cyprus can also be considered to be in violation of
article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which demands United Nations'
members to refrain in their international relations from threats of force or
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state. Moreover, as Greece was a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee,
Greece also transgressed that Treaty which endorses the territorial integrity
and political independence of Cyprus. 80
Turkish Action. Greek intervention led to a counter intervention-an inva-
sion of Cyprus by the armed forces of Turkey. The Turkish representative
before the United Nations Security Council stated that this armed invasion
was taken "to end decades of strife provoked by extremist elements." 8' He
went on to say that Turkey as guarantor under the Treaty of Guarantee was,
in taking this action, simply fulfilling its legal responsibility; that its action
was not taken as an aggression but to end an aggression. 82
Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee upon which Turkey depended for
legality provides:
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty,
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together
with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure
observance of those provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible,
each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action
with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the
present treaty.83
The validity of these treaty provisions have been subjected to contest. In
1963 when the Cyprus case first came before the Security Council, the
Cypriot representative claimed that Article IV of the Treaty was invalid as
contravening the principle of jus cogens, i.e., violation of peremptory norms
of international law.8 4 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties in speaking of the principle of jus cogens declares:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For tlie purposes of
79. 43 DEPT. STATE BULL. 358 (1960). See also A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS,
JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 350-51 (1965).
80. 382 U.N.T.S. 4-6 (1960).
81. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 22.
82. Id.
83. 382 U.N.T.S. 6 (1960).
84. U.N. SCOR, 1098th meeting 15-21 (1964). The representative of Cyprus is also
quoted in 2 A. CHAYEs, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
1250-54 (1969). For discussion of the invalidity of such treaties as that of the Treaty of
Guarantee see G. ZOTIADES, INTERVENTION BY TREATY RIGHT-ITS LEGALITY IN PRESENT
DAY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); Zotiadem, The Treaty of Guarantee and the Principle
of Non-Intervention, 3 CYPRUs TwlY 1 (1965).
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the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having -the same character.85
The peremptory norms of international law said to be violated by article
IV of the Treaty of Guarantee were articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter. Article 2(1) declares the organization to be based on the
sovereign equality of states, and article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
a state. Additionally, the customary rule of international law which prohibits
forceful interventions into the internal affairs of a state may have been
violated by the Treaty. Attention was also directed to article 103 of the
Charter which provides that the Charter shall control in the case of conflict
between obligations assumed thereunder and obligations under any other
international agreement entered into by members.
In its 1963 consideration of the Cyprus issue, the Security Council
abstained from expressing an opinion as to the validity or invalidity of the
Treaty, but later, in 1965, when the General Assembly was seised of the
Cyprus question, that body by a divided vote implied treaty invalidity on the
basis of jus cogens. It adopted a resolution which took "cognizance of the
fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations,
is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy,
and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any
foreign intervention or interference. 86 States were also called upon to
conform with their obligations under articles 2(1) and 2(4) "to respect the
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it. ' 'sT
Although the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties may become a
significant landmark for international law, it still has not yet entered into force
because it has not obtained the necessary number of ratifications. Thus,
applicability of the principle of jus cogens depends upon its acceptance as
part and parcel of customary public international law, and over this theory
there is much controversy. Although it has been pointed out that probably a
majority of publicists favor some rule to the effect that a treaty cannot
derogate from a fundamental norm of international law, still there are many
opposed on the ground that it is not possible to define in judicial terms the
substance of peremptory international norms. There is little evidence of state
practice on the matter.88
85. Conference Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 23 May 1969, as contained in UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS, VIENNA,
26 MARCH-24 MAY 1968 AND 9 APRIL-22 MAY 1969, OFFICIAL RECORDS, DOCUMENTS OF
THE CONFERENCE 289, 296 (1971).
86. G.A. Res. 2077, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
87. Id.
88. For discussion of the principle of jus cogens see T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF
TREATIES 177-87 (1974); I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 110-31 (1973); Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formu-
lated by the International Law Commission,.61 AM. ,.,INT'L L. 946 (1967).
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The Cypriot representative also claimed that article IV of the Treaty of
Guarantee was an unequal or "leonine" treaty, that is, a treaty in which
unequal bargaining power of the parties enables the stronger to foist upon the
weaker a treaty with terms contrary to ,the interests of the latter and which in
addition are in opposition to principles of justice.8 9 The inequality of
bargaining power in effect works a coercion on the weaker power and such
coercion becomes ground for invalidation of the treaty. There has been some
support for such a viewpoint, but the notion that treaties may be rendered
void because of coercion is not widely accepted.90 To accept such a rule
would mean that any treaty between a great and a small power would
always be open to charges of invalidity. 91
Even if one proceeds on the assumption that jus cogens is a principle of
international law, a further consideration must be given to the Cypriot claims
that the Treaty of Guarantee is void. Does the Treaty indeed derogate from
the peremptory norms as alleged? To base invalidity upon contrariety with
the Charter principle of sovereign equality is troublesome. 92 There seems to
be little agreement as to its meaning. It does fuse together two fundamental
concepts of international law-state sovereignty and equality of states. Some
have concluded from a perusal of the San Francisco proceedings which
brought forth the United Nations Charter that new rights in addition to those
imposed upon states in other articles of the Charter are not conferred by this
statement. Moreover, experience has indicated that the principle of sover-
eign equality has served primarily as an argument for a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the powers of the organs of the United Nations rather than as a
safeguard of sovereignty and equal rights of states. But others, although
recognizing the lack of consensus as to what sovereign equality entails, have
concluded that at the least it protects the independence of states from foreign
interventions. 93 Taking either viewpoint, however, the norm of non-inter-
vention which is a peremptory norm of international law as well as the
peremptory norm of article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force can be
considered contravened by a treaty giving a right to use armed force against
a state to the extent that these norms do inhibit use of force. In those
instances where force might not be prohibited the treaty would be valid.
Moreover if one proceeds upon the assumption that jus cogens is not a rule
of international law and that the Treaty of Guarantee is still valid, it can be
argued that the Turkish invasion was illegal because it is contrary to article
2(4) and to the non-intervention principle if no legal exception under these
principles can be found which would give legality to such use of force.
89. See note 84 supra.
90. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 594-95 (2d ed.
1974); Schwelb, supra note 88, at 966.
91. Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 1060-62.
92. The Charter of the United Nations states: "The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1. For
discussion of the meaning of this article see L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 37-40 (3d ed. 1969). See also T. EHRLICH, CYPRUS
1958-1967, at 73-74 (1974).
93. A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., supra note 73, at 70-97.
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At general international law, armed interventions were normally illegiti-
mate except under special circumstances. Intervention was considered as
legal when exercised in pursuance of the right of self-defense and as a
sanction. The United Nations Charter seriously proscribes any armed inter-
vention by the language of article 2(4), yet the Charter establishes two
exceptions, that is, when the force is used in the exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense as expressly permitted by article 51, and
when force is used in the execution of collective enforcement measures by
the United Nations itself as authorized by the Charter. 94 Thus if resort to
armed force is so restricted, Turkey can only claim that its use of armed
force was legal through a right of self-defense.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter permits the inherent right of
individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations until the Security Council takes the necessary measures to
maintain international peace and security. Has Turkey been subjected to an
armed attack so as to permit an exercise of the right of self-defense? Neither
its territory nor its political independence has been subjected to attack. The
victim was Cyprus. Although Turkey does not appear to have relied upon a
right of individual self-defense to justify its armed invasion, still its represent-
ative before the Security Council used words which might indicate that
Turkish action was so predicated:
Turkey's preoccupation with Cyprus was primarily and foremost with
,the security, rights and legitimate interests of the Turkish community
in Cyprus. 95
The Government of Turkey saw no alternative to the peaceful solu-
tion of the problem. It had no territorial claim over Cyprus; its first
and foremost anxiety was the security and well-being of the Turkish
Cypriot community . . .6
Thus the security of the Turkish Cypriot community demanded armed
defense in face of the alleged violent attacks by the Greek Cypriots and
Cypriot National Guard.
Traditional international law did include within the right of self-defense a
state's defense of its nationals from violence in the territory of a foreign state
where the foreign state was unable or unwilling to extend the necessary
protection. A state could meet not only attacks against its territory, its armed
forces, vessels or aircraft, but also against its citizens. This right of self-
defense was grounded upon the notions that nationals of a state are an
extension of the state itself and represent a part of the state as important as
its territory; that an injury to citizens is an injury to the state; and finally,
that an essential function of the state, indeed a reason for its being, is the
protection of nationals. Hence, when a state fails to comply with the
applicable international law as regards the lives of foreigners within its
94. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42, authorize the Security Council to take measures
including the use of force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security
in the face of threats to and breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.
95. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 42.
96. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1975, at 5.
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territory, the state of nationality may, in extreme circumstances, exercise the
right of self-defense and protect them with armed force.97 This right is also
permitted by article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
However, any attempt to base the Turkish intervention on a right of self-
defense cannot be justified, for the rule permits such an exercise only on
behalf of the exercising state's nationals or citizens. It is not extended to
nationals of other states. The Turkish Cypriots are nationals of Cyprus not
Turkey. Therefore, in order to justify its forceful intervention on behalf of
citizens of Cyprus, Turkey would have to rely upon other grounds.
At traditional international law the legal right of humanitarian interven-
tion was asserted and was at times acted upon. It was held that when a state,
although acting within its sovereign prerogatives, so violated the rights of
humanity beyond all limits of reason and justice. whether the violations
applied to its own nationals or nationals of other states, a right to intervene
by members of the family of nations was lawful. 98 However, in spite of this
recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention by customary internation-
al law, strict principles of modern treaty law such as the United Nations
Charter ban on the threat or use of force could be interpreted as prohibiting
the landing of troops even for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, a strict
interpretation of the non-intervention principle would also bar humanitarian
intervention. Nevertheless there are certain jurists who defend the right of
humanitarian intervention as an unwritten exception to all rules whether set
forth by customary or by particular international law. But other jurists
oppose this view, pointing out that in the twentieth century many nations
recognize terror as a legitimate method of government, and even' the most
revolting violations of the common laws of decency and humanity committed
by a government against its own people or against foreigners who are not
nationals of a protesting state would not be sufficient legal jusitification for
unilateral humanitarian intervention in face of the international rules barring
forceful interventions. 'If the society of nations desired to exclude humanitari-
an intervention from these prohibitions they would have done so expressly.99
The United Nations Charter also recognizes a right of collective self-
defense.100 If collective self-defense means no more than that a state has a
right of self-defense and that other states have a right to come to its
assistance when it is subjected to an illegal armed attack, then an argument
can be made that the Turkish action was an exercise of such a right.' 0 ' The
Turkish Prime Minister in explanation of the invasion stated:
97. 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289(1963); D. BoWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-105 (1958); Waldock,
The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
RECUEIL DES CouRs 455, 466-67 (1952).
98. On humanitarian interventions see A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 LEGAL ASPECTS 18-23 (The Hammarskj6ld Forums
1966).
99. Id. See also A.V.W. THoMAs & A.J. THOMAS, JR., supra note 73, at 372-90.
100. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
101. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 792 (1950); H. KELsEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d e4., Tucker ed., 1967).
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It is acknowledged all over the world that the coup which recently
took place was manufactured by the dictatorial rdgime of Athens. In
fact it was much more than a coup: it was the forcible and flagrant
violation of the independence of Cyprus . . . . This is not an invasion
but an act against an invasion. This is not an aggression but an act
to end aggression . . . When the takeover by the Nikos Sampson
administration took place, with the dramatic ousting of Archbishop
Makarios, and when it became clear that the invasion by Greece-and
'invasion' was the word used by Archbishop Makarios to describe what
Greece was doing-would not cease depite protracted negotiations in
various capitals and in the Council, Turkey exercised its legal rights
under the Treaty of Guarantee, with the sole aim of returning the
island as a whole to constitutional rule and protecting the Turkish
community's right within -that framework.10 2
Although article 51 of the United Nations Charter is silent concerning the
necessity of a request for aid by the attacked state as a precondition of an
exercise of collective self-defense, it has been maintained that an explicit
request is requisite even when there is a long standing mutual defense
treaty.-10 The requirement that aid must be requested by the injured party
has been set forth in order to prevent possible simulated aggression which
might occur under the guise of conferring aid upon a victim of a supposed
attack. If such a request is a condition for legality, then a state acting in the
absence of such a request would be in violation of the Charter of the United
Nations. There was clearly no request for Turkish intervention from the
governing authority of the Republic of Cyprus.
Collective self-defense can also be interpreted in a manner differing from
collective defense in that it actually signifies that two or more states can take
collective action in the right of self-defense. Then a request from the state
actually under attack would not appear requisite. Following this line of
thought, a neighboring state might act in self-defense if it could show some
legal interest of its own being invaded. Ordinarily if one state is subjected to
an illegal armed attack by a second state, this would not be an invasion of
the legal rights of a third state. However, it has been recognized that a third
state may act in self-defense to assist another state in repelling an aggression
when there exists a close relationship between the two states based on
solidarity, for the legal interests of both would be violated by an armed
attack against either one of them. 'If the security of a group of states is
dependent in fact upon the security of each and every one of them, a
violation of the rights of any member of the group would be a violation of
all, permitting joint efforts for protection.' 0 4 Thus if Cyprus were subjected
to an aggression then Turkey would suffer a violation of its own legal rights
and could exercise its right of collective self-defense to protect not only
against injury to itself but also against injury to Cyprus with no request from
the latter. If the Treaty of Guarantee in fact created such a close relationship
102. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 22.
103. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, 103 RECUBIL DES CouRs 347, 369
(1961).
104. Bowett advances such a position. See D. BowErr, supra note 97, at 200-48.
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then perhaps a right of self-defense can be upheld. Whether the Treaty did
create a mutual security relationship is subject to dispute. The three guaran-
tors were not seeking to guarantee their own security or the security of the
region. They were seeking to set up a regime under which the two Cypriot
communities could live side by side, and the right of intervention was given
only to maintain the status quo, that is, to maintain the regime. Thus one can
hardly conclude that the legal interests of Turkey were in any way endan-
gered by the illegal coup d'6tat sponsored by Greece sufficient to justify
collective self-defense.
There is another troublesome aspect. The exercise of a legal right of self-
defense, individual or collective, must always be proportionate. The act of
self-defense must not be excessive, going no further than to avert or suppress
the attack.105 Is a prolonged occupation of a large part of Cypriot territory by
40,000 men of the Turkish military proportionate to an exercise of a right of
self-defense against a forceful coup d'9tat carried out on the order of the
Greek military government, particularly at a point in time when that
government has fallen and the duly elected President of Cyprus, Makarios,
against whom the coup was attempted, has been restored to power? It would
take a glib orator to contend that proportionality had been met under such
conditions.
It has also been asserted that the Treaty of Guarantee creates a regional
arrangement. Several such regional organizations exist. Nations of a region
cooperate for certain purposes including peacekeeping in the area. A region-
al arrangement has been defined in the following way:
There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a
permanent nature grouping in a given geographic area several coun-
tries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or
cultural, linguistic, historical, or spirtual affinities, make themselves
jointly responsible for peaceful settlement of any dispute whch may
arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in
their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the
development of their economic and cultural relations. 10
The Treaty of Guarantee concerns three nations of the Mediterranean
area as well as the United Kingdom which has important interests in the
area. Although such arrangements generally tend to promote the common
interests of the various countries in the region rather than the interests of
only one state, still changes in the status quo of Cyprus would vitally affect
peace in the region. Thus the Treaty of Guarantee can be considered to be
directed to the maintenance of regional peace and the security of state
members of the organization, as well as maintaining peace between the
communities in Cyprus. However, this is a somewhat dubious argument in
the light of the language of the Treaty itself which, as previously noted,
105. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 80-82 (2d ed., Tucker ed.,
1967).
106. UNCIO, Interim Report to Committee 111/4 by Subcommittee 111/4/A, Doe.
533, III/4/A/9, at 3 (Documents, XII, at 850).
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reveals an intention to protect Cyprus rather than the guarantor countries.
Moreover, such regional arrangements generally do not permit unilateral
action (other than individual and collective self-defense) without consulta-
tion by the members and without a decision based upon a certain majority
vote. 10 7 Under the somewhat anomalous provisions of the Treaty of Guar-
antee consultation is required before action can be taken, but if concerted
action does not prove possible the guarantors reserve the individual right to
act in order to preserve the state of affairs in Cyprus.
If the Treaty of Guarantee does create a regional agency or arrangement,
and if the Treaty is valid, would this give legality to the Turkish action? It
must be reemphasized that the use of force other than in an exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense or in pursuance of the collective
measures under United Nations auspices seems to be barred by the United
Nations Charter. That Charter does authorize regional arrangements or
agencies if their purposes accord with Charter provisions, but article 53
provides that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrange-
ments or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council." If Turkey could bring its case under individual or collective self-
defense, of course its action would be valid under article 51. But if its action
was not individual or collective self-defense but "enforcement action," then it
would be illegal unless taken with Security Council authorization. Turkey
had no such authorization.
Although there is authority that non-forceful measures of regional organi-
zations may not fall within any definition of "enforcement action," there is
strong support for the view that any use of physical force must fall within a
definition of "enforcement," and, therefore, the use of physical force can
only be legally taken with prior Security Council authorization.,0 However,
the International Court of Justice in The Certain Expenses case has limited
the meaning of "enforcement action" to those actions taken by the Security
Council under its powers as conferred by chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter against a threat or breach of the peace or an act of aggression. In
speaking of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Congo, the
Court declared that such operations did not constitute enforcement action:
[Such operations] did not include a use of armed force against a State
which the Security Council, under Article 39, determined to have com-
mitted an act of aggression or to have breached the peace. The armed
forces which were utilized in the Congo were not authorized to take
military action against any State. The operation did not involve 'pre-
ventive or enforcement measures' against any State under Chapter VII
and therefore did not constitute 'action' as that term was used in Article
11.109
107. On the Organization of American States and the system of peace and security in
the Western Hemisphere see A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., supra note 79, at 249-
76.
108. Id. at 269-71. See also H. KELsEN, TI LAw OF THE UNrrED NATONS 921-23
(1950).




In the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis the Malaysian representative
speaking before the United Nations called the operations of the peacekeep-
ing force of the regional organization, the Organization of American States,
to be not "enforcement" action but "conciliatory" action. 110 In that case
the regional force was used in a situation of "civil disorder, political chaos,
bloodshed and internecine war," and thus, perhaps could not be equated
with enforcement action against an aggressor state or peace-breaking or
peace-threatening state."'
Moreover, in the Cuban missile crisis case a spokesman of the United
States refused to designate the armed quarantine of Cuba by the Organiza-
tion of American States an "enforcement action." It was called an action
designed to maintain peace in the hemisphere taken under the regional
agency's co-jurisdiction with the Security Council in an effort to preserve
peace."1 2 Can the armed invasion by Turkey of Cyprus be considered as a
measure not taken against an aggressor or a state breaching or threatening to
breach the peace, but to preserve the status quo under the Treaty, to protect
the Turkish community and to end civil strife therein? According to the
Turkish representative, it was not taken as aggression but to end an
aggression."11 Can it further be agreed that it was action taken as provided
by the Treaty creating a regional organization under that organization's co-
jurisdiction with the Security Council to preserve peace? The co-jurisdiction
contention is shaky at best. Regional agencies are obliged to conform to the
Charter. 114 The consensus is that under the Charter the superior body is
granted the right to use force, and states are prohibited from such use by
article 2(4) other than as permitted by the right of individual or collective
self-defense under article 51. Co-jurisdiction would seemingly place the
world and regional organizations on the same legal level. Such a conclusion
is difficult to accept. If the Turkish use of armed force was an enforcement
measure it apparently would require Security Council authorization for legal
regional action. The statements by the International Court of Justice which
might justify the Turkish action seem hardly apropos to the case of what in
reality is a unilateral armed intervention by a single state in the affairs of
another state taken to enforce a treaty right.
Actually Turkey has not rested its invasion of Cyprus upon a right of self-
defense or upon purported and dubious rights under a regional arrange-
ment, but upon the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish Prime Minister
expressed it in these words: "Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence
and constitutional order of Cyprus. Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibili-
ty by taking this action.""" Another Turkish representative before the
United Nations used similar language: "Turkey exercised its legal rights
under the Treaty of Guarantee, with the sole aim of returning the island as a
110. U.N. Doc. S/PV/1222, at 67-68 (1965).
111. On this aspect of the Dominican situation see A.V.W. THoMAs & A.J. THOMAS,
JR., supra note 98, at 42-49.
1,12. Chayes, Law and Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FoREIoN AFFAmS 550, 556 (1963).
113. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
114. U.N. CHARTm art. 52(1).
115. 11 U.N. MoNTHLY Ca LE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 22.
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whole to constitutional rule and protecting the Turkish community's right
within that framework."" 16
Turkey has claimed that the Treaty of Guarantee does not contravene
the United Nations Charter, and further that the use of armed force in
accordance with the terms of the Treaty is not contrary to article 2(4) of the
Charter. As has been noted previously, one line of authority takes a rigid
point of view with respect to the use of force, asserting that the only possible
legal uses under the Charter are the collective enforcement measures author-
ized thereby or force used in a legitimate exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defense." 7 It might well be true that this viewpoint was
largely in accord with the intent of the framers. On the other hand, there are
less rigid interpretations of the Charter's ban on the use of force. The
language of article 2(4) prohibits force only when directed against the
territorial or political independence of a state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Turkey has maintained
that its intervention by armed force is permitted under the Treaty of
Guarantee and that since its armed intervention was not directed against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Cyprus it does not violate the
United Nations Charter. To the contrary, Turkey's use of force was action in
aid thereof, inasmuch as the Treaty of Guarantee had as its purpose the
maintenance of Cypriot independence and territorial integrity. Turkish action
taken under the Treaty to reestablish the state of affairs created by the Treaty,
i.e., to prevent and do away with a foreign intervention designed to abrogate
that state of affairs, could not be action against Cypriot territorial integrity or
political independence. Indeed it was action to maintain such." 8
Still a question remains as to whether this use of force could accord with
the final phrase of article 2(4): was it consistent with the purposes of the
United Nations? The 1960 accords, the state of affairs which the Treaty of
Guarantee was to protect, were aimed at the protection of the Turkish
Cypriot minority. The accords sought to eliminate strife and violence be-
tween the communities so that the island could have internal peace. The
Turks argue that since such strife could undermine peaceful relations between
Turkey and Greece, a side effect of the accords was the maintenance of inter-
national peace. The achievement of such a purpose can hardly be inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."" Forceful action to assure the
carrying out of such purpose when conducted under an authorizing treaty and
in accord with its terms could not be considered as opposed to United Nations
purposes unless the Charter does indeed prohibit all use of force except that in
self-defense or collective enforcement measures. It has been contended in
some quarters that the rigid view of the Charter's total ban of force would pre-
116. Id.
117. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
118. 20 U.N. SCOR, 1234th meeting 23-24 (1965) (setting forth the Turkish position
on this point as argued previously before the Security Council). See also T. EHRLICH,
supra note 36, at 76.
119. See discussion by Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 1072-74.
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vent a state from protecting even its legitimate interests. It would seem that
the vindication of treaty rights such as those guaranteed under the 1960 ac-
cords and the Treaty of Guarantee would be legitimate interests of the guar-
antors. Justice, for example, is also listed as a purpose of the United Nations,
and if a state cannot protect its legitimate rights or obtain protection for them
through collective measures or otherwise, then the principle of justice can
hardly be said to exist. 120
If one accepts the view that the use of armed force to uphold the Treaty
of Guarantee would not necessarily be illegitimate under the Charter, then as
long as Turkey was acting within the terms of the Treaty her actions were
legal. Conversely, if Turkey failed to abide by the terms of the Treaty, then
her actions were illegal. It will be remembered that the Treaty of Guarantee
calls upon the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey "to consult together with
respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of
[its] provisions." But in the event concerted action is not possible each party
"reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state
of affairs created by the present treaty.' 121
An initial problem concerns the meaning of the word "action" as used in
the Treaty. Does the action which the Treaty permits include the use of
armed force? There is controversy as to what the parties intended in this
respect and no evidence from the negotiating history is helpful. Commenta-
tors of Greek and Greek Cypriot origin have taken the viewpoint that the
word "action" was not intended to include armed action. If it were, the
guarantors would have specifically spelled it out. Moreover they continually
assert that if the Treaty did permit armed action it would be violative of
articles 2(4) and 103 of the United Nations Charter. 122 When the Cyprus
case was before the Security Council in 1964 a Greek representative flatly
declared that the intention of the guarantors was not to permit a use of
armed force. 123 The British representative at the meeting seemed to disagree
and implied that in certain circumstances the Treaty contemplated the use of
armed force and such use would not violate the United Nations Charter.12 4
According to one commentator the guarantors could not agree as to what
"measures" should be permitted and thereby left the meaning of "action"
ambiguous. This, it is urged, would militate against an interpretation allowing
the use of force, for any such ambiguity should be interpreted in opposition
to a limitation of Cypriot sovereignty. 125 However, this same author goes on
to say that the conditions of bloodshed on the island at the time the Treaty
was negotiated would make it very plausible that the parties did intend to
permit a use of force if necessary to restore the state of affairs which the
Treaty and the accords sought to bring about, and thus assure a peaceful
Cyprus and the end of violence between the communities. 26
120. For a discussion of this thesis see J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 92-
103 (1958).
121. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
122. P. POLYVlOU, supra note 8, at 71-72.
123. 19 U.N. SCOR, 1097th meeting 32 (1964).
124. Id.




Assuming that armed force was intended to be within the meaning of
"action," still certain conditions precedent are set forth before armed action
can be taken. Under the Treaty, Turkey was required to consult with the
other two parties to determine what representations or measures were
necessary to ensure the observance of the Treaty provisions. Only in the
event that concerted action was not possible did there arise a right of
unilateral action. The record shows that the Turkish Prime Minister did
consult with the British Government following the coup d'gtat. The other
coguarantor, Greece, however, was not present. The British intended that
Greece should be brought into the consultation, but the Turkish invasion
occurred before this could be accomplished. There was an exchange of views
carried on separately by "shuttle diplomacy" between the Greeks and the
Under-Secretary of State of the United States and between Turkey and the
Under-Secretary. However, this can hardly be considered a consultation
between co-guarantors envisaged by the Treaty.127 Thus the condition
precedent of consultation was not met prior to Turkey's armed action.
Since there was no proper consultation how could it be known whether
common or concerted action to ensure observance of the Treaty provisions
could have been possible? Turkey's unilateral action could not be considered
legitimate unless such common or concerted action was impossible. Further-
more, Turkey's right to unilateral action was only permissible under the
Treaty's terms in order to re-establish "the state of affairs created by the
treaty . . . ." to maintain the status quo in Cyprus. This status quo certainly
included the continuation and maintenance of the independence, territorial
integrity and security of Cyprus as well as the state of affairs which
were created by the basic articles of the Constitution. Initially, perhaps there
may have been justification for the Turkish action on these grounds. If the
action was taken to end the illegal Greek intervention and to prevent enosis,
then it would accord with Turkey's pledge to guarantee the political indepen-
dence of Cyprus and to re-establish the constitutional order by returning to the
status quo. This is precisely what Turkey has claimed: "Turkey exercised its
rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, with the sole aim of returning the
island as a whole to constitutional rule and protecting the Turkish communi-
ty's right within that framework.' 28
Their case was somewhat weakened by the fact that the leaders of the
coup did state that there was no intent to change the constitutional order set
up by the accords and guaranteed by the Treaty or to bring about immediate
enosis. Nevertheless, there still remains the Greek intervention and the
resulting violation of Cypriot political independence which could well justify
Turkish action to end such intervention, particularly in the light of EOKA-B
assertions that the Greek coup was intended to effecutate enosis with Greece,
forbidden by the Treaty. Thus, although some legal arguments can be made
upholding the initial armed action of Turkey, after the coup failed and the
former constitutional regime was re-estabished a legal basis for further
127. For these exchanges see P. PoLYviou, supra note 8, at 69.
128. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 22.
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armed occupation could no longer be sustained. This is particularly true in
view of the fact that the Turkish action brought about a radical change in the
state of affairs created by the Treaty, and considering the fact that Turkey
has repeatedly stated that there can be no return to the status quo ante in
Cyprus. 129
Turkey has divided the island into two separate geographic zones and has
declared Cyprus a federal state composed of two areas. Each area is to have
a primarily Greek or Turkish population. A unitary Cyprus has disap-
peared for the time being. Moreover, Turkey demands an entirely new
constitutional framework for Cyprus, stating that there can be no return to
the original document, for the events of 1963 when ,President Makarios
refused to observe certain of the provisions of the Constitution in effect killed
that Constitution. An anomaly is apparent. In one breath Turkey invokes the
Treaty of Guarantee to re-establish the constitutional regime of Cyprus and
in the next it claims a right to establish a whole new regime on the ground
that the Constitution is inoperative.
Turkey can point to the rule of international law that the material breach
of a treaty by one of the parties, in this instance the Greeks or the Greek
Cypriots, suspends the operation of the treaty.' 30  But if the treaty is
suspended, then Turkish action cannot be based thereon. In the absence of
a treaty right her claims to legitimacy cannot be sustained and even under
the Treaty they are tenuous at best.
The United Nations and Turkish Action. Turkey has clearly ignored the
resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, primarily
the Security Council's Resolution 353131 and the General Assembly's Res-
olution 3212 (XXIX)*132 The resolution of the Security Council ex-
presses concern with respect to a situation which "led to a serious threat
to international peace and security." Among other things, this resolu-
tion called for a cease-fire on Cyprus and demanded "an immediate end
to foreign military intervention." Furthermore, a request was made for
withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from the island other than
those there under authority of international agreement. The resolution
of the General Assembly among other things urged the speedy withdrawal
of foreign armed forces and military personnel and a cessation of foreign
interference.
If these resolutions are binding, then Turkey in failing to end her armed
intervention and withdraw military personnel violated her obligations assumed
under the Charter, particularly article 25 by which the members of the
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council taken in accordance with the Charter. The resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly in the peacekeeping area, no matter how worded, are recom-
129. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, March 1975, at 4.
130. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 947-48 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed.,
1955).
131. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1974, at 23-24.
132. 11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec. 1974, at 35-36.
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mendations only, and as such are not considered legally binding when directed
at a member or members although they should have moral force and effect.1 33
In contrast, the Security Council's resolutions may well be legally binding.
Under articles 41 and 42 the Security Council may decide that certain col-
lective measures should be taken in order to maintain or restore international
peace in the face of an aggression, a threat to the peace or a breach of the
peace. An order to take such collective measures is legally binding.13 4
The Security Council did not state the article of the Charter upon which
Resolution 353 was based. It was not an enforcement measure as defined
by articles 41 and 42 which would be a decision calling for a collective use
of armed force or lesser collective coercive measures such as those of an
economic or diplomatic nature against a peace threatener, peacebreaker or
an aggressor. The resolution would then seem to fall under article 40 as
a provisional measure. In previous Security Council cases the Council
has based resolutions calling for cease-fires and withdrawal of armed forces
upon this article. Article 40 declares:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or de-
sirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the
rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Coun-
cil shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.13 5
A call for provisional measures has been interpreted to mean no more
than a recommendation for provisional measures. Such an interpretation
would make such a call non-binding, for recommendations by their nature
are not binding. However, the use of the word "call" would seem to signify
something more than a mere recommendation. In previous cases, where calls
for provisional measures have been made by the Security Council they have
been considered binding upon those against whom directed, and there is
general agreement today that they should be considered as obligatory when it
is clear that the Council's resolution is founded on article 40. This would of
course be clear if the Security Council cited article 40 as the basis for the
resolution, but this is not the case. But even in the absence of such
indication, a resolution has been given binding effect if a formal determina-
tion and statement was set forth in the resolution that it was taken because of
a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. This
would demonstrate that the measure was taken under chapter VII of the
charter entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." If it was not a measure taken under
articles 41 and 42 of chapter VII then it must be a provisional measure
under article 40 of chapter VII. Resolution 353 stated that the Security
133. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 92, at 126.
134. Id. at 209; cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
135. U.N. Charter art. 40 (emphasis added).
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Council was concerned with "a situation which has led to a threat to
international peace." Even under article 40 the language of the resolution
must be couched in legally binding terms; it must be mandatory against those
to whom it is directed. A mere request to withdraw foreign military
personnel could hardly be considered as creating a legal obligation to
withdraw. On the other hand, a demand for an end of foreign military
intervention, as was involved in this case, would be a command meant to be
obeyed.1 36 Turkey failed to follow the command of the Council to end its
foreign military intervention in Cyprus. Thus it violated the resolution of the
Security Council and in effect violated the United Nations Charter.
The Turks, however, apparently interpreted the provision of the resolution
as being non-obligatory unless certain other conditions were met. In Decem-
ber 1974 the Security Council by Resolution 365 endorsed the General
Assembly's resolution and called for its speedy implementation. 187  The
Assembly urged an end to foreign interference in Cyprus and commended
that negotiations take place on an equal footing between the representatives
of the two communities to reach a mutually acceptable political settlement.
In Resolution 364 the Council also reaffirmed other resolutions, including
353.138 Thus, it would seem that the Council was still demanding an end to
foreign intervention. Speaking in regard to the General Assembly resolution
and its endorsement by Council resolution, a spokesman for Turkey de-
clared that:
there were two equal national communities in Cyprus; the constitutional
system of Cyprus primarily concerned the Turkish and Greek Cypriot
communities; political settlement should be sought and found in Cyprus
through intercommunal negotiations on an equal footing.
As progress was made towards a peaceful settlement, as a feeling
of security was re-established, all foreign forces would be withdrawn
and the humanitarian problem, including the problem of refugees,
would be solved. The questions of refugees and of withdrawal of forces
were political and could only be solved within the framework of a final
political settlement.
One does not need to be a prophet to be able to anticipate what could
and would happen if the Turkish forces were to be withdrawn tomorrow
or if 150,000 Greek Cypriot refugees were -to return to the north.'8 9
In other words, Turkish troops need not be withdrawn until there is a
political settlement which will permit them to withdraw, thus apparently
interpreting the Security Council's call as non-binding or at least not binding
until the political settlement is also reached.
There was some support for this view in light of the fact that the Security
Council in later meetings refused to set a definite time limit 40 for withdraw-
al of the Turkish forces despite urgings of certain delegations to do so.
136. On the obligatory effect of resolutions of the Security Council under article 40
of the Charter see L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 92, at 306-08.
137. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1975, at 3.
138. Id. at 15.
139. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, March 1975, at 8.
140. Guyana and Tanzania urged that a time limit be set. id. at 19-20.
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Moreover, if he Turkish representative's statement is correct as to the spirit
or interpretation of the General Assembly's resolution, the endorsement and
the call for implementation thereof as soon as possible by the Council can
suggest that the call for the ending of foreign intervention was conditioned
upon an acceptable political settlement. Such a position, however, is hard to
maintain in view of the words of the Council as well as the General
Assembly which demand and urge the end to such foreign intervention.
III. CONCLUSION
It is a sad commentary on the state of the world that the Cyprus crisis, like
so many other world crises, brings forth little beyond a torrent of words on
the international level. In face of aggression compounded, illegality following
illegality, one can only hark back to the plaint of Eliza Doolittle of "My Fair
Lady," when she declares "Words, words, words, I'm so sick of words . . .
show me." One longs to see some showing of a resolution of this fifteen-year-
old problem. The United Nations has spoken in strongly worded resolutions.
The Great Powers have all had their say. The Greeks and the Turks have
spouted vitriol one to the other. The protagonist communities argue, contend
and wordily advance their respective positions. Still the people of Cyprus
suffer.
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